Colaform Project Workshop
Bamberg, March 22nd/23rd

Keynote Speakers:
Bernhard Kittel (Vienna)
Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)

Bernhard Kittel:

Title:
Deliberation in Laboratory Experimental Chats

Abstract:
We discuss some possibilities to explore information derived from chats in laboratory experiments on collective decision making. Set in a multi-party election with costly voting, some voters are incentivized as partisan voters for either one of two parties, whereas another group of voters has incentives to vote strategically. A third party is supported by computerized voters and voters have to join forces in order to win against that third party. In this setting, voters deliberate on a coordinated vote for either one of the two parties under two conditions: chats are either only possible within parties or comprise all voters. As expected, the ability of voters to coordinate increases with the transparency of the constellation. Analyzing the process of deliberation adds substantially to the understanding of the processes leading to the outcome. We study first stated voting intentions, shifts in voting intentions due to deliberation, and strategic moves in the course of deliberation. The results point to the large impact of the concrete setting on the representation of interests, but also to the importance of individual strategies.

Wlodek Rabinowicz

Title:
Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs From Aggregation of Preferences

Abstract:
This talk will focus on the comparison between aggregation preferences and aggregation of value judgments. The targeted comparison is one in which the two aggregation scenarios exhibit a far-reaching structural similarity: in both cases, the individual inputs and the collective outputs are assumed to be rankings – preference rankings in one case and value rankings in the other. I will argue that, despite of this formal similarity, the two aggregation scenarios are importantly different: the kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of value judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The relevant kind of procedure consists in minimization of distance between individual inputs and the collective output. It is shown that, whatever distance measure is chosen, distance-based procedures violate the (strong) Pareto condition. This seems alright when it comes to value judgments, but would not be appropriate for preference aggregation.

When applied to judgment aggregation, distance-based procedures might also be approached from the epistemic perspective: questions might be raised concerning their advantage as truth-trackers. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the output being true, but also its expected distance from truth, i.e. its expected verisimilitude..